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WHAT HAPPENED IN IOWA?
David E. Pozen*
Reply to: Nicole Mansker & Neal Devins, Do Judicial
Elections Facilitate Popular Constitutionalism; Can They?, 111
Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 27 (2011).
November 2, 2010 is the latest milestone in the evolution of state judicial
elections from sleepy, sterile affairs into meaningful political contests.
Following an aggressive ouster campaign, voters in Iowa removed three
supreme court justices, including the chief justice, who had joined an opinion
finding a right to same-sex marriage under the state constitution.1 Supporters
of the campaign rallied around the mantra, “It’s we the people, not we the
courts.”2 Voter turnout surged to unprecedented levels;3 the national media
riveted attention on the event. No sitting Iowa justice had ever lost a retention
election before.4
Although unusually dramatic, this episode is continuous with what has
transpired in other recent high court races. In fact, it bears striking parallels to
the 1986 California Supreme Court race that helped launch the modern era of
judicial elections. Then as now, a well-financed attack on one set of liberal

* Special Assistant to the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State. Thanks to William Baude,
Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Josh Chafetz, Charles Geyh, Alon Harel, Jeremy Kessler, Jason Mazzone,
Kristin Olson, Adam Shinar, and Robert Wiygul for helpful comments. The views expressed
herein are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of State
or the United States Government.
1. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
2. A.G. Sulzberger, In Iowa, Voters Oust Judges over Marriage Issue, N.Y. Times, Nov.
3, 2010, at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/us/politics/03judges.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (quoting signs at election night party); see also id. (quoting statement by
leader of ouster campaign that result “will send a message across the country that the power
resides with the people”).
3. See Mark Curriden, Judging the Judges: Landmark Iowa Elections Send Tremor
Through the Judicial Retention System, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2011, at 56, 57 (reporting turnout rose
more than twenty percentage points above typical rates); Jason Clayworth, Midterm Vote Saw
Record Turnout, Des Moines Reg., Nov. 30, 2010, at B1 (reporting elections drew “the largest
midterm . . . turnout in Iowa history”).
4. A.G. Sulzberger, Voters Moving to Oust Judges over Decisions, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25,
2010, at A1.
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decisions (overturning death sentences) led retention election voters to unseat
three justices, including the chief justice, for the first time in the state’s
history.5
I. THE IOWA ELECTIONS AS POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
The Iowa results, which came in after my article Judicial Elections as
Popular Constitutionalism went to press, would seem to confirm the article’s
claim that “judicial elections have the capacity to serve . . . as highly
consequential vehicles of popular constitutionalism.”6 The ouster vote
represented a symbolic affirmation of popular sovereignty,7 generated public
accountability,8 and fostered extensive legal dialogue.9 Through the election
mechanism, ordinary citizens joined together to engage a contested
constitutional question and to assert their primacy over judges in the
elaboration of constitutional meaning—“we the people, not we the courts.”
Whether Iowans learned anything in the process about themselves or their
constitution,10 and whether their intervention will ultimately lead to a change
in the governing law, remains to be seen.
Regardless of one’s views on how judges ought to be selected or how
constitutional controversies ought to be resolved, it remains possible to decry
the outcome in Iowa. November 2 was a bitter day for those who saw the state
supreme court’s ruling as a triumph for civil rights and progressive
constitutional change. But it is important to appreciate that the fact that three
justices got thrown out for the way they decided a value-laden case is not, in
itself, evidence of an institutional breakdown. It is evidence of a healthy
electoral system.11 Crudely put, if you are appalled by the manner in which
Iowans registered their dissent, then you are appalled by the logic of judicial
elections, and you probably don’t much like popular constitutionalism either.
In their engaging response to my article, Nicole Mansker and Neal Devins
question whether judicial elections really do, and ever can, facilitate popular

5. David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 265, 287 & n.99
(2008) [hereinafter Pozen, Irony of Elections]. Importantly, though, whereas the California
justices were accused of consciously and chronically disregarding state law, no such charge was
leveled against their Midwestern counterparts.
6. David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 Colum. L. Rev.
2047, 2052 (2010) [hereinafter Pozen, Popular Constitutionalism]; see also id. at 2053–64
(explaining theory of popular constitutionalism).
7. See id. at 2068–70 (discussing judicial elections’ potential to serve as “critical
moments for expressing the people’s active, ongoing sovereignty” (quoting Larry D. Kramer, The
People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review 197 (2004) [hereinafter
Kramer, The People Themselves])).
8. See id. at 2070–71 (discussing judicial elections’ potential to serve as “accountability
mechanisms”).
9. See id. at 2073–74 (discussing judicial elections’ potential to stimulate constitutional
dialogue).
10. See id. at 2074–76 (discussing judicial elections’ potential to serve as “teaching
moments”).
11. See Pozen, Irony of Elections, supra note 5, at 296–300, 310–13. Healthy, that is,
according to basic precepts of electoral theory. I do not mean to claim that the Iowa system is, all
things considered, a good system, or that it worked in the way its framers intended.
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constitutionalism.12 “The root problem,” they argue, is lack of “voter interest
in [and knowledge about] either the state or federal constitutions”;13 on
account of these deficits, judicial elections will seldom achieve significant
levels of constitutional dialogue and will instead tend to center on
nonconstitutional issues. In these arguments, Mansker and Devins build on
their valuable previous work on the ways in which state courts respond to
public opinion14 and on the difficulties posed by low-information voters.15
Professor Devins is a leading proponent of the view that state courts have the
ability to incorporate popular sentiment into their decisionmaking coherently
and efficaciously, and a leading critic of the view that popular
constitutionalism, in the form envisioned by scholars such as Larry Kramer
and Mark Tushnet, is either viable or desirable.
These arguments largely complement my own. Although I do not believe
that current levels of public ignorance and apathy are quite as ruinous as
Mansker and Devins suggest, I agree that they pose a major impediment to any
plan to realize popular constitutionalism.16 Mansker and Devins’s admonition
that constitutional issues often have low salience in judicial races echoes part
of my overinclusiveness critique.17 Their suggestion that elected judges may
debilitate civic debate and ossify legal doctrine by hiding from contentious
issues aligns with my discussion of the dynamics of backlash.18 Both of our
pieces take pains to emphasize that “the different natures of state and federal
constitutions must be acknowledged in any state-focused theory of popular
constitutionalism,”19 and that “other state features outside of judicial
elections,” such as initiatives and referenda, appear “better suited to advance
the popular constitutionalists’ goals.”20 And we are joined in our concern that,
to an undue degree, “what competitive judicial elections do is politicize the
court[s].”21
Yet seemingly unlike Mansker and Devins, I would not write off judicial

12. Nicole Mansker & Neal Devins, Do Judicial Elections Facilitate Popular
Constitutionalism; Can They?, 111 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 27 (2011),
http://columbialawreview.org/assets/sidebar/volume/111/27_Mansker.pdf.
13. Id. at 37.
14. See generally Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences into
Account: Toward a State-Centered Understanding of State Constitutionalism, 62 Stan. L. Rev.
1629 (2010); Neal Devins & Nicole Mansker, Public Opinion and State Supreme Courts, 13 U.
Pa. J. Const. L. 455 (2010).
15. See generally Ilya Somin & Neal Devins, Can We Make the Constitution More
Democratic?, 55 Drake L. Rev. 971 (2007); Neal Devins, The D’oh! of Popular
Constitutionalism, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1333 (2007) (reviewing Jeffrey Rosen, The Most
Democratic Branch: How the Courts Serve America (2006)) [hereinafter Devins, Popular
Constitutionalism].
16. See Pozen, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 6, at 2093–99.
17. See id. at 2104–08.
18. See id. at 2128–33.
19. Mansker & Devins, supra note 12, at 31; see Pozen, Popular Constitutionalism, supra
note 6, at 2088–93.
20. Mansker & Devins, supra note 12, at 37; see Pozen, Popular Constitutionalism, supra
note 6, at 2088–93, 2110–12, 2119–23.
21. Mansker & Devins, supra note 12, at 36.
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elections as potential outlets for popular constitutionalism.22 Indeed, it is that
very same politicization of the courts that underlines the possibility. The
observation that many of these elections have “focus[ed] on single issues,”23
such as the constitutional status of same-sex marriage, is not an indictment of
their capacity to play this cultural and functional role, but rather a testament
thereto.
My article explored a variety of reasons why judicial elections are liable
to be compromised (as well as unattractive) vehicles of popular
constitutionalism. The article also explained, though, how under the right
conditions they may be able to get the job done. While advocates of “popular
constitutionalism” have not defined the concept with precision, it would take a
stringent and particular understanding for the Iowa elections—with their
record-breaking turnout, historic removal votes, and intense public agitation
over a burning equal protection question—to be left out. No one ever said
popular constitutionalism would be pretty.
II. CROSS-BORDER (AND INTERNAL) COMPLICATIONS
Except when one looks closely, the example of Iowa turns out to be a
little more complicated, for a reason that Mansker and Devins identify in
passing: “[O]n constitutionally salient issues like same-sex marriage, out-ofstate interest groups often play a defining role in financing negative advertising
and otherwise seek to shape judicial elections.”24 We now know that out-of22. It appears we may also part company on the question whether contested elections are
liable to undermine the legitimacy of state supreme courts—or at least, on how best to frame this
inquiry. Following political scientist James Gibson, Mansker and Devins suggest that “judicial
elections might legitimate state supreme court decisionmaking” by attracting the support of
voters. Id. at 32 n.23. This sociological understanding of legitimacy looks to the beliefs that
members of the public hold, and scholars like Gibson use polls and surveys to test it. See, e.g.,
James L. Gibson et al., The Effects of Judicial Campaign Activity on the Legitimacy of Courts:
A Survey-Based Experiment, 64 Pol. Res. Q. (forthcoming 2011) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review). In my own scholarship, I have been more interested in testing the work of the courts
against normative conceptions of legitimacy that do not directly depend on public opinion, which
has long favored judicial elections at the state level, reflects widespread ignorance about what
judges do, is heavily susceptible to priming effects, and may have a built-in majoritarian bias.
23. Mansker & Devins, supra note 12, at 36. The observation that judicial elections have
also focused on “irrelevant personal characteristics,” id., is, however, a large problem for any
popular constitutionalist account or defense thereof. See Pozen, Popular Constitutionalism, supra
note 6, at 2104–08, 2111.
24. Mansker & Devins, supra note 12, at 35–36. One might also question whether the
Iowa process was sufficiently focused, deliberative, and informed; perhaps many voters registered
their views on same-sex marriage generally rather than on the justices’ ruling per se. In his
excellent overview of the elections, Todd Pettys contends that “[w]hat makes the Iowa experience
so problematic is that, no matter what one’s political preferences might be on the issue of samesex marriage, one who reads the [Iowa Supreme Court’s] Varnum opinion will find that the
court’s reasoning fell well within the parameters of established methods of constitutional
analysis.” Todd E. Pettys, Letter from Iowa: Same-Sex Marriage and the Ouster of Three
Justices, 59 Kan. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 3) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review); see also id. (manuscript at 15) (emphasizing “visceral punch” of anti-retention
advertisements, as compared to “more substantive and high-minded”—and therefore less
effective—messages of pro-retention groups); Tyler Buller, Note, Framing the Debate:
Understanding Iowa’s 2010 Judicial Retention Election Through a Content Analysis of Letters to
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state groups spent more money on the Iowa elections than did in-state
groups.25 A similar financial dynamic characterized California’s Proposition 8
campaign,26 which overturned the state supreme court and deconstitutionalized
the right to same-sex marriage. These outcomes highlight a number of
challenging normative questions for popular constitutionalism, including the
classic concerns over whether it is sufficiently rational and rights-protective.
The role of out-of-state influences raises a more basic, definitional question,
about the contours of the community of persons meant to participate in popular
constitutional lawmaking.27 The notion that the people themselves ought to
determine their own constitutional fate certainly sounds stirring. But who are
“the people”?
The
literature’s
answer
has
been
straightforward—popular
constitutionalism is meant to empower “ordinary citizens” in the
administration of fundamental law.28 In its standard formulation, the theory
pits alienated common folks against aloof federal judges. The latter have
steadily arrogated to themselves all the interpretive power, even though in our
democratic scheme the former were meant to rule; it is the great burden of
modern constitutionalism to overthrow judicial supremacy and rectify this
historic inversion. The first wave of popular constitutionalism’s critics
featured several scholars, Professor Devins among them, who questioned
whether ordinary citizens have the capacity or the will to take the Constitution
away from the courts.29 (Others questioned whether “we the people” and “we
the Editor, 97 Iowa L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 23) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (finding “[t]he second most common frame used by anti-retention advocates,” in
letters published by newspapers, “was that Varnum was wrongly decided for religious or moral
reasons”).
25. The vast majority of out-of-state spending went to the anti-retention side. See Roy A.
Schotland, Iowa’s 2010 Judicial Election: Appropriate Accountability or Rampant Passion?, 46
Ct. Rev. 68, 70–71 (2011) (reporting three out-of-state organizations together spent over
$900,000 against justices, whereas “[t]he main in-state sum spent against [them] was $10,178”);
Press Release, Brennan Ctr. for Justice et al., 2010 Judicial Elections Increase Pressure on Courts,
Reform Groups Say 3–4 (Nov. 3, 2010) [hereinafter Iowa Press Release], at
http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/Democracy/release-november%202010-110310-final.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting out-of-state organizations accounted for
roughly $700,000 of $800,000 spent to defeat justices, versus roughly $400,000 spent by in-state
organizations in support of justices).
26. See Dan Morain, Proposition Funds Flow from out of State, L.A. Times, Aug. 1,
2008, at A3 (stating “[a]t least 39% of the $3.3 million supporting Proposition 8’s proposed ban
on same-sex marriage has come from outside California,” while “[o]pponents have drawn 52% of
their $5.7 million from outside the state”); John Wildermuth, Prop. 8 Among Costliest Measures
in History, S.F. Chron., Feb. 3, 2009, at B1 (“Millions of dollars in out-of-state money flowed
into both campaigns . . . .”). Much of the analysis in this essay would also apply, mutatis
mutandis, to California’s Proposition 8 struggle.
27. The role of out-of-state influences, in other words, takes us all the way back to “step
zero” of political theory, to the identification of the polis.
28. Kramer, The People Themselves, supra note 7, at 248; see also Larry D. Kramer,
Popular Constitutionalism, circa 2004, 92 Calif. L. Rev. 959 passim (2004) [hereinafter Kramer,
Popular Constitutionalism] (repeatedly identifying “ordinary citizens,” along with political
officials, as subjects of popular constitutionalism).
29. See generally Doni Gewirtzman, Glory Days: Popular Constitutionalism, Nostalgia,
and the True Nature of Constitutional Culture, 93 Geo. L.J. 897 (2005); Devins, Popular
Constitutionalism, supra note 15.
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the courts” ought to be seen in such oppositional terms.30) Focused on the
national level, these scholars expressed skepticism that a sufficiently large,
representative, and informed swath of Americans could be counted on to fulfill
the active, lawmaking role that the theory would assign to them. The
deliberative and participatory preconditions of popular constitutionalism might
only rarely be attainable.
When we shift our focus down to the states, however, the incompleteness
of this debate quickly becomes apparent. We observe that the United States
contains not one but a multiplicity of constitutional orders, formally
independent from yet deeply interconnected with each other, as well as a
multiplicity of populist legal devices such as initiatives, referenda, recalls,
legislative overrides, attorney general elections,31 and judicial elections. The
institutional architecture of popular constitutionalism is far more elaborate,
visible, and robust at the subnational level; scrutiny of the states helps expose
just how underspecified the standard theory is. This is not to say that popular
constitutionalists ought to have accorded state constitutional systems equal
stature or significance as the federal system. Yet given their positive aim of
exploring how ordinary citizens experience and contribute to constitutional
interpretation, their normative aim of reclaiming “diffuseness and
decentralization” in the construction of legal norms,32 and the critical
importance of state courts and constitutions in the life of the country, it seems
likely that many would find state constitutionalism highly relevant to their
project.33 Of particular interest here, the Iowa elections demonstrate how the
permeability of state boundaries puts pressure on the assumption of a unitary
“people” aspiring to self-rule.
Popular constitutionalism, in short, has a federalism problem. My article
focused on judicial elections, but the problem is more general: State-state and
state-national tensions could arise from all manner of popular constitutional
activities. The balance of this essay will explore one facet, by showing how
the role played by out-of-state interests in Iowa invites us to think critically
about the notion of popular sovereignty that underlies the literature.
A. Confusion
When they unseated three justices on account of the same-sex marriage
30. See generally Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 Mich. L.
Rev. 2596 (2003) (questioning empirical basis of claim that strong forms of judicial review
undermine democracy); Lawrence G. Sager, Courting Disaster, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1361 (2005)
(questioning theoretical basis of this claim).
31. See Joseph Blocher, Popular Constitutionalism and the State Attorneys General, 122
Harv. L. Rev. F. 108, 111–15 (2011) (suggesting state attorneys general ought to play larger role
in accounts of popular constitutionalism).
32. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 28, at 963.
33. See Pozen, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 6, at 2066–68, 2108–10 (explaining
“why popular constitutionalists have ample reason to care about state courts and constitutions,
independent of their federal analogues”); cf. Sanford Levinson, Courts as Participants in
‘Dialogue’: A View from American States 5–15 (2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (reviewing debate over “ontological status” of state constitutions—
whether they deserve to be considered “genuine” sources of higher law—and documenting their
practical and sociological importance).
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ruling, were Iowans truly exercising their own collective authority to control
the courts and determine constitutional meaning? Or did the role of external
money and advocacy dilute or distort the popular basis of the act? Of course,
only Iowa residents were allowed to cast a ballot. But to some degree their
votes, and their decisions whether or not to vote, were influenced by out-ofstate sources. Those influences might call into question the authenticity of the
revolt, the sense in which Iowans authored the achievement.
This point should not be confused with the stronger claim that genuine
popular constitutionalism requires exclusively or predominantly grassroots
action—mobbing, perhaps. Any such standard would be unrealistic in modern
society. A certain amount of dedication, deliberation, and agreement may be
all we can reasonably ask for in a constitutional politics. Yet even if some
might see spending by corporations and special interests to jeopardize the
purity, integrity, and organicity of ballot outcomes generally, in light of the
realities of the political marketplace and the limits of civic competence, one
need not necessarily go that far to appreciate the distinctive concerns raised by
cross-border expenditures.34
When money pours into a state, it can help amplify debate and invigorate
the efforts of local actors, and thereby augment popular forces that were
already stirring. The interactions between internal and external social
movements may be mutually reinforcing rather than unidirectional. This was
evident in Iowa, as local norm entrepreneurs coordinated with out-of-state
allies to form and operate ad hoc campaign organizations, particularly on the
pro-incumbent side.35 Yet this dynamic can also attenuate the relationship
between that state’s citizens and the constitutional ends they pursue. The
salience of one or both sides’ positions, if not also the substance, may to some
extent be manufactured by individuals and entities who are not part of the
relevant decisionmaking community. (Assuming, that is, that popular
constitutionalism prioritizes the will of a bounded community over, say, a
universal communicative rationality.
Let us provisionally adopt this
assumption, which is consistent with the literature’s emphasis on “ordinary
citizens” and the “will of the people.”36) Empirically, moreover, the extent to
which outside groups have been affecting local policy processes, whether to
distort or enrich them, will often be very difficult to tell.
A hypothetical involving non-U.S. outsiders may help sharpen the point.
If, in support of Arnold Schwarzenegger’s candidacy for president, a
grassroots movement swept the nation and ushered in an amendment repealing

34. These concerns may be especially acute when the underlying issue is, as in Iowa, one
of state law. It is easier to appreciate why all Americans might have an interest in supervising the
state courts’ administration of federal constitutional guarantees.
35. See Pettys, supra note 24 (manuscript at 9–15) (detailing these interactions); cf. David
E. Pozen, We Are All Entrepreneurs Now, 43 Wake Forest L. Rev. 283, 294–314 (2008)
(explaining concepts of social, policy, norm, and moral entrepreneurship).
36. Let us also bracket the various objections that might be raised to the notion of a
“popular will” on questions of constitutional meaning. See Pozen, Popular Constitutionalism,
supra note 6, at 2120–22, 2132. I am grateful to Robert Wiygul for incisive comments on this
subject.
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the United States Constitution’s Natural Born Citizen Clause,37 most observers
would, I assume, have little trouble identifying this phenomenon as popular
constitutionalism. Should we feel any differently if it turns out that Austrian
supporters of Schwarzenegger conceived, spearheaded, and/or bankrolled the
movement?38
B. Competition, Conflict, and Conformity
The Iowa elections stimulated a kind of mass constitutional competition,
over whether to support or oppose same-sex marriage and judicial recognition
of new constitutional rights, that has in recent years been all but absent at the
national level. Ordinary citizens literally rallied to the cause of their
constitutional beliefs. With competition, however, comes division. Candidate
elections not only galvanize social forces but also sharpen and dichotomize
them. They render constitutional argument as political theater, a pitched battle,
with the judicial aspirants as the personification of one side’s hopes,
grievances, and worldview. Lacking the elaborate procedural rules and
professional norms of litigation, the structured reasoning and justification of
judicial opinions, or the multistage, supermajority hurdles imposed by most
constitutions’ formal amendment processes,39 the constitutional competition
waged through judicial elections tends to be comparatively thin, shrill, and
abrupt.40 Negative advertisements pumped in from out of state only
exacerbate the divisiveness of the drama. We might generalize this
(concededly unsubstantiated) claim: Relatively undisciplined, unmediated,
majoritarian acts of constitutional decisionmaking—truly populist forms of
popular constitutionalism—are as liable to fracture as to unite a people.
Judicial elections can also breed second-order competitive effects. To the
extent that local mechanisms of popular constitutionalism allow states to
develop distinct constitutional cultures, norms, and policies, they may help
37. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (limiting presidential eligibility to “natural born
Citizen[s]”).
38. Or does this analogy falter because the Austrians, as foreigners, would have limited
affective ties to and knowledge of this country, and therefore suspect motives? Or because they
have no basis to participate in the United States constitutional amendment process, whereas U.S.
citizens from one state do have an entitlement to participate, indirectly, in the constitutional
amendment processes of other states (at least for issues such as marriage that implicate norms of
comity and recognition)? To reject the analogy on this latter ground, one would presumably have
to reject the notion that the U.S. states are fully sovereign entities with respect to their own
constitutions.
39. It is notable in this regard that the Iowa Constitution is substantially more difficult to
revise than most other state constitutions. See Pettys, supra note 24 (manuscript at 7, 18–19, 25–
26) (explaining Iowa amendment process and positing “[t]here might be an inverse relationship
between the ease with which activists can place a proposed constitutional amendment before the
voters and the likelihood that justices will be targeted for non-retention”).
40. Compared to the constitutional competition elicited by presidential elections and
federal judicial appointment fights, on the other hand, the Iowa experience does not look so
anomalous. All departmentalist models of popular constitutionalism ultimately rely on selection
mechanisms to determine who will be authorized to speak for the people on constitutional
matters; it is unsurprising that those mechanisms would become sites of political struggle. See
Pozen, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 6, at 2063–64 (discussing relationship between
departmentalism and popular constitutionalism).
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capture some of the benefits we associate with decentralization, “provid[ing]
an additional and more accessible platform for collective deliberation,”
“facilitat[ing] exit and voice in constitutional lawmaking,” “hold[ing] up a
mirror to the national model.”41 By empowering voters to fashion their courts,
elections can, at least in theory, contribute to a more vibrant system of
constitutional federalism. This is not necessarily a good thing. When it comes
to matters of fundamental rights and constitutional affiliation, values such as
local particularism and experimentalism take on a decidedly ambiguous cast.
For this reason, among others, a number of scholars have criticized ambitious
schemes of state constitutionalism as threats to the larger project of American
constitutionalism.42
The role of out-of-state influences creates a more basic complication. By
injecting themselves into the Iowa elections, national groups like the Family
Research Council43 have done more than skew these contests and put pressure
on the remaining justices to reverse course and deconstitutionalize same-sex
marriage. They have also sent a warning to elected judges across the country
that their seats may be targeted, too. The most profound impact of the ouster
campaign likely lies not in its visible effects within Iowa but in its invisible
chilling effects on courts beyond. The campaign was conservative in its
resistance to judicial creativity and legal change as well as in its substantive
content. Its goal was to homogenize U.S. constitutional practice by bringing
an outlier state back into line with the prevailing sociolegal norm and, in so
doing, to reinforce that norm. The net result of the Iowa elections, then, may
well be a national constitutional landscape that is less dynamic and diverse, in
that the United States will have fewer jurisdictions that grant same-sex
marriage rights, and fewer judges in the other jurisdictions who are willing to
stick out their necks on this issue or related issues. In a federated polity,
certain types of constitutional competition within states can depress
constitutional competition among states.
There is another, more concrete sense in which the competitive pressures
of judicial elections may bear on the question of who constitutes “the people”
in popular constitutionalism. In resolving disputes that cut across jurisdictional
lines, elected judges have a strong incentive, if not also a political mandate, to
privilege their own constituents’ interests above the interests of outsiders. This
hometown bias is one of the best-known criticisms of elected judges. What is
less appreciated is that the same set of incentives can affect purely domestic
disputes, when the “outsiders” are noncitizen residents who lack the franchise
or minority groups who are widely despised in the broader population.
Irrespective of the legal merits, recognizing new rights for a class of illegal
aliens—or, in certain states, of gay plaintiffs—is not a good career move for
the elected judge.
41. Id. at 2109.
42. See id. (discussing “theorists of state constitutionalism [who] have argued that the
development of a vigorous, self-conscious model threatens to subvert the operations of federal
constitutionalism”).
43. See Iowa Press Release, supra note 25, at 3 (identifying National Organization for
Marriage, American Families Association, Family Research Council, Campaign for Working
Families, and Citizens United as major funders of Iowa ouster campaign).
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“The people” and “the citizenry” are frequently conflated in the popular
constitutionalism literature. Yet if “the people” encompasses all persons who
live within a sovereign territory, these two groups are not coextensive. While
this conflation may in some cases be the product of loose language rather than
deliberate choice, it smuggles in a controversial judgment on citizenship as a
prerequisite to the right to participate in consideration of constitutional
questions. Whether or not one agrees with this judgment matters a great deal
to the question of how to realize popular constitutionalism in practice.
Institutional mechanisms such as judicial elections that tend to empower
“ordinary citizens” in the administration of constitutional law may tend to
disempower noncitizens. Within as well as across communities, we must come
to terms with who is and who is not a proper subject of popular
constitutionalism.
C. Conversation and Commotion
Thus far, we have been focusing on some of the less appealing
implications of the insight that the Iowa elections were not entirely a local
event. But let’s not forget that the activists from other states who devoted their
time and resources to the Iowa campaign were themselves engaging in a kind
of popular constitutionalism. For those who feel passionately that same-sex
marriage deserves no constitutional protection, the campaign provided a forum
for testing this position and a focal point for enhancing public awareness and
mobilizing public support. Through their advocacy in Iowa, these activists
sparked a national conversation about same-sex marriage rights and the role of
the courts—a conversation that could affect the trajectory of constitutional law
in this area for years to come. Iowa’s unique role in the U.S. presidential
selection system further magnifies the significance of the results. Several
potential Republican presidential candidates for 2012 promptly celebrated the
ouster vote as a model of democratic action; Newt Gingrich expressly
connected the vote to popular constitutionalist (and Tea Party) themes,
heralding the “citizen revolt” now underway against “dictatorial” judges.44
Hence, while the cross-border aspects of the Iowa elections may have
weakened their claim to being a pure instance of constitutional selfdetermination, those same aspects also made the elections more relevant on a
broader stage. This sort of interstate spillover, this blurring of the local and the
national, reflects a larger trend in American electoral politics. As judicial
elections have increasingly drawn the attention of major media outlets and
advocacy groups, and as congressional elections have increasingly become
referenda on national issues,45 these races have become increasingly important
44. See Pettys, supra note 24 (manuscript at 19–20) (describing reactions of Mike
Huckabee and Newt Gingrich and quoting Gingrich); Catalina Camia, Bachmann Praises Ouster
of Iowa Judges in Gay Marriage Ruling, USA Today, Mar. 24, 2011, at
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/onpolitics/post/2011/03/michele-bachmann-judgesiowa-gay-marriage-/1 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (summarizing remarks of Michele
Bachmann); Iowa Press (Iowa Public Television broadcast Feb. 25, 2011), available at
http://www.iptv.org/iowapress/episode.cfm/3825 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(interviewing Rick Santorum about his views on, and role in, ouster campaign).
45. Cf. Rick Pildes, Political Polarization and the Nationalization of Congressional
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contributors to the national discourse of popular constitutionalism.
Robert Post and Reva Siegel astutely observed in 2007 that “state court
opinions about state law are venues within which national values are
continually contested and reshaped.”46 State court elections can be even more
vibrant venues in this respect. Their publicity, accessibility, and winner-takesall format give them significant power to catalyze and crystallize constitutional
argument.
***
So, the relationship between popular constitutionalism, federalism, and
judicial elections turns out to be quite complicated, conceptually as well as
empirically. A full treatment would require a major undertaking, a book.
Here, I hope simply to have shown that popular constitutionalism is not only
more legible at the state level but also more institutionally and intellectually
complex, more promising but also more problematic.
III. POLITICAL JUDGES, BOUGHT JUDGES, AND JUDICIAL ELECTION
REFORM
A final note on a subject that Mansker and Devins raise in closing.47 If
one is distressed by the recent events in Iowa and by the political turn in
judicial elections more generally, what can be done?
It is helpful, in thinking about reform possibilities, to disentangle two
criticisms of judicial elections. The first criticism is that elections generate
judges who are more likely to conform their outputs to constituent preferences.
The second criticism is that elections generate judges who are more likely to
rule in ways that gratify their campaign supporters, as an incentive or reward
for such support. Although frequently conflated, these two types of deviations
from the ideal of the wholly law-bound jurist are fundamentally different. The
former reflects a defensible theory of how elected judges ought to negotiate
legal indeterminacy, even if I personally do not agree with it.48 The latter is a
species of official corruption and is unacceptable under any theory of
judging.49 The threats posed to the rule of law and to the integrity of the
courts from “political” judges are less profound, and different in kind, from the
threats posed by “bought” judges. And whereas judges have always been
(partially) political throughout U.S. history, and have always been accused of
such, it is doubtful that the threat of justice for sale has ever been so
widespread.
Elections, Balkinization, Nov. 4, 2010, at http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/11/politicalpolarization-and.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (summarizing evidence of “rise of
more nationalized [congressional] elections” and hypothesizing that party polarization is main
cause).
46. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash,
42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 373, 382 (2007).
47. Mansker & Devins, supra note 12, at 36–37.
48. See Pozen, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 6, at 2083–86 (analyzing
relationship between judicial selection methods and jurisprudential methods under rubric of “role
fidelity”).
49. See Pozen, Irony of Elections, supra note 5, at 290–93 (distinguishing judicial
favoritism from judicial majoritarianism).
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The public has started to appreciate this problem. Retired Supreme Court
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has been unflagging in her efforts to expose and
combat campaign-related improprieties.50 Newspaper editorials routinely
highlight the ethical and due process concerns raised by judges’ hearing cases
that involve contributors.51 The Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Caperton
v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,52 in which the chief executive of a West Virginia
coal company had spent millions on behalf of a state supreme court candidate
who went on to cast the deciding vote in an appeal brought by the company,
drew sustained national attention to the issue. Just the other day, New York
court officials announced a ban on elected judges’ hearing cases when any of
the lawyers or parties has donated $2,500 or more to their campaigns in the
preceding two years.53 There is real hope, in the short- and medium-term, that
states will address this second criticism of elective judiciaries through recusal
reforms and related measures.54
There is far less hope that states will address the first criticism, for doing
so requires nothing less than a return to the days of unexciting and
uncompetitive judicial races or, perhaps more realistically, abandonment of
judicial elections altogether. Indeed, to the extent that concerns over “judicial
politics” have informed recent debates over how to select judges, they have cut
in the opposite direction. Supporters of elections have gotten tremendous
mileage out of empirical findings and common-sense perceptions that
appointed courts respond to various extralegal influences, such as partisan
affiliations and reappointment incentives, and in this sense are “political”
too.55 Given that all judges are to some extent legal policymakers who do not
and could not resolve cases on the basis of legal sources alone, supporters of
elections often assert, it follows that judges ought to be subject to electoral
control like other high-level policymakers.56
This does not follow. Just because judging may involve significant
decisional discretion, does not mean that judges ought to be subject to such
intensive popular supervision. As my article explains, there are many reasons,
50. See, e.g., Sandra Day O’Connor, Justice for Sale, Wall St. J., Nov. 15, 2007, at A25.
51. See, e.g., Editorial, Justice Not for Sale, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 2009, at A26.
52. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
53. William Glaberson, State Is Cutting Judges’ Ties to Lawyers Who Are Donors, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 14, 2011, at A1.
54. See generally Deborah Goldberg, James Sample & David E. Pozen, The Best
Defense: Why Elected Courts Should Lead Recusal Reform, 46 Washburn L.J. 503 (2007)
(reviewing state recusal rules and outlining possible reforms).
55. It is important to maintain perspective on this point. For a compelling account of how
“judicial politics” scholars have overstated the case that political preferences affect judicial
decisionmaking, see Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Distorting Slant in Quantitative Studies of Judging,
50 B.C. L. Rev. 685 (2009).
56. See, e.g., Michael R. Dimino, Sr., The Worst Way of Selecting Judges—Except All
the Others That Have Been Tried, 32 N. Ky. L. Rev. 267, 268 (2005) (arguing judicial elections
are preferable because of “the opportunity they provide for a free people to choose those officials
who exercise policy-making authority”); see also Chris W. Bonneau & Melinda Gann Hall, In
Defense of Judicial Elections 138–39 (2009) (emphasizing that even life-tenured “judges are
political beings who make political decisions,” and accusing judicial election opponents of “not
just assaulting a method for choosing judges but also . . . waging war on democratic processes
and the rights of citizens to maintain control over government”).
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including democratic reasons, why it may be healthy to insulate one branch of
government from direct forms of public discipline.57 The observation that all
judges are political does not entail that it would be futile or misguided to try to
make them less political, or to make them political in different ways than other
officials are. Recusal reforms, U.S. Supreme Court guidance, and media
scrutiny may help stave off additional abuses of the kind that took place in
West Virginia.
Unless and until this subtler—and fundamentally
antipopulist—point gains widespread traction, we can expect to see more of
what happened in Iowa.
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